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Elaine Craig*
This article considers how the law of sexual assault in Canada addresses
cases involving intoxicated complainants. There are two main aspects to the
law of capacity to consent to sexual touching in the context of intoxicated
women. The first involves the evidence of intoxication courts typically
require in order to prove lack of capacity. The second pertains to the legal
standard to which that evidence is applied. The nature of the evidence
required to establish incapacity turns on the level of capacity the law
requires. A comprehensive review of Canadian caselaw involving intoxicated
complainants reveals a legal standard that is too low and an evidentiary
threshold that is too high. The result: no matter how severely intoxicated a
woman was when the sexual contact occurred, courts are unlikely to find
that she lacked capacity to consent unless she was unconscious during some
or all of the sexual activity.
Dans cet article, l’auteure examine la manière dont le droit en matière
d’agressions sexuelles au Canada traite les cas impliquant des plaignantes
en état d’ébriété. Le droit relatif à la capacité de consentir à des
attouchements sexuels dans le contexte de plaignantes en état d’ébriété
comporte deux éléments principaux. Le premier a trait à la preuve de l’état
d’ébriété généralement exigée par les tribunaux afin d’établir l’absence de
capacité. Le second concerne la norme juridique à laquelle s’applique cette
preuve. La nature de la preuve exigée pour établir l’absence de capacité
dépend du degré de capacité exigé par la loi. Un examen approfondi de
la jurisprudence canadienne impliquant des plaignantes en état d’ébriété
témoigne d’ une norme juridique qui n’est pas assez exigeante et un seuil de
preuve trop élevé. Résultat : peu importe la gravité de son intoxication lors
des attouchements à caractère sexuel, il est peu probable que les tribunaux
concluent qu’une femme n’avait pas la capacité de consentir, à moins
qu’elle ait été inconsciente pendant toute la durée ou une partie de l’activité
sexuelle.

*
Associate Professor, Schulich School of Law. I would like to thank Isabel Grant,
Janine Benedet, Lise Gotell and David Tanovich for their insights and feedback regarding
an earlier draft of this article. Thank-you to Emily Wang and Jake Harris for their excellent
research assistance and to Steve Coughlan for the very helpful discussions. I would also
thank the anonymous peer reviewers who assessed the piece for the Canadian Bar Review,
your comments undoubtedly improved the article.

2020]

Sexual Assault and Intoxication: Defining (In)Capacity to …

71

Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
2. A
 dding Unconsciousness to Section 273.1(2) Was an Unnecessary
and Illogical Revision to the Criminal Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
3. The Evidentiary Threshold: Intoxication Short of Unconsciousness
Will Almost Never Result in a Finding of Incapacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
A) Some judges explicitly, but erroneously, require evidence of
unconsciousness to find incapacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
B) In some cases (lack of) unconsciousness is relied upon as the
evidentiary proxy for identifying incapacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
C) Requiring evidence of unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy
for incapacity fails to distinguish between complainants with lowered
inhibitions and loss of inhibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87

4. T
 he Legal Standard: The Threshold Established by the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi Fails to Sufficiently Protect the Sexual
Integrity of Intoxicated Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
A) A standard based on the ‘nature and quality of the sexual
activity’ rather than the risks and consequences it presents creates
an inappropriately low threshold for capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
B) The ‘nature and quality of the sexual activity’ standard is inherently
unclear and difficult to apply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102
C) A standard which focuses on whether one understands they can say
yes or no rather than on whether one has the capacity to give meaningful
consent is insufficiently protective of women’s sexual integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102

5. C
 apacity to Assess the Risks and Consequences of the Sexual
Activity at Issue Would Provide a Clearer, More Just Standard . . . . . . . . .  103
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  107

1. Introduction
A woman who was too drunk to insist on a condom when she was
ovulating, or notice the multiple sores on and around the accused’s penis
before he penetrated her vagina, or understand the risks associated with
allowing an unmedicated HIV positive man to ejaculate inside her, but
aware enough to know she was being penetrated and could say no, is
unlikely to be afforded legal protection under the law of sexual assault in
Canada.1 A woman who was so intoxicated she was “falling down drunk,”2
1

As will be explained in Part 4, these are the logical implications of the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal’s reasoning in R v Al-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10 [Al-Rawi (NSCA)].
2
R v Tariq, 2016 ONCJ 614 at para 94 [Tariq]: “the court cannot conclude
incapacity to consent from the mere fact that the complainant is effectively falling down
drunk”.
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had vomited on herself and cannot remember anything that happened,3
or was unable to dress herself properly and was “puking up leaves,”4 is
unlikely to be found by a Canadian court to have lacked the capacity to
consent to the sexual touching that occurred while she was in this state.
Unless she was also unconscious. Recent amendments to the Criminal
Code definition of consent to sexual touching are unlikely to remedy this
failure of the criminal law in Canada.
This article considers how the law of sexual assault in Canada
addresses cases involving intoxicated complainants. There are two main,
interrelated aspects to the law of capacity to consent to sexual touching
in the context of intoxicated women. The first involves the evidence of
intoxication courts typically require in order to prove lack of capacity. The
second pertains to the legal standard to which that evidence is applied.
The nature of the evidence required to establish incapacity turns on the
level of capacity the law requires. A comprehensive review of Canadian
caselaw involving intoxicated complainants reveals a legal standard that is
too low and an evidentiary threshold that is too high.
Two legal developments to the law of capacity to consent to sexual
touching have occurred in the past two years in Canada: one through
revisions to the Criminal Code pursuant to Bill C-51,5 and a second through
interpretation by appellate courts in Nova Scotia and Ontario.6 Neither of
these legal developments will serve to clarify this uncertain and difficult
area of sexual assault law. Neither of these legal developments will aid in
protecting the sexual integrity of severely intoxicated women—a group
who are at greatly increased risk of sexual violence and who currently
receive very little legal protection.7
The remainder of the article is divided into four parts. Part 2
explains why the federal government’s recent revision to the Criminal
Code definition of consent to sexual touching was both unnecessary and
illogical. Part 3 examines the evidentiary approach courts have taken in
3

R v TJ, 2018 ONSC 6385 at paras 12, 27 [TJ] (complainant found to have
capacity despite evidence she was “very intoxicated”, slurring her words and had vomited
on herself).
4
R v C(K), 2016 ABPC 242 at para 19 [KC].
5
Bill C-51, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act
and to make consequential amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, (assented
to 13 December 2018), SC 2018, c 29 [Bill C-51].
6
Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1; R v GF, 2019 ONCA 493 at para 37, rev’g 2016
ONSC 3465, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38801 (9 January 2020) [GF].
7
See Janine Benedet, “The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women” (2010) 22:2
CJWL 435; Sharon Cowan, “The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the
Evaporation of Consent” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 899.

2020]

Sexual Assault and Intoxication: Defining (In)Capacity to …

73

sexual assault cases involving severely intoxicated women. One of the
challenges with the lack of certainty in the caselaw, and the lack of an
adequate statutory definition for incapacity, is that judges risk conflating
incapacity and unconsciousness such that they inadvertently become coextensive. The result is an extremely onerous evidentiary requirement in
which, absent evidence of unconsciousness, even profoundly intoxicated
women will not be found to have lacked capacity to consent. Of course,
the evidentiary approach taken in incapacity cases will turn on the legal
standard for capacity that courts rely upon.
Part 4 shifts focus from the statutory framework and evidentiary
approach to incapacity due to intoxication to the legal standard for
capacity recently established by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,8 and
subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v GF.9 The
legal standard articulated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R v AlRawi, that borrows from the sexual fraud caselaw, uses language which
was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in the sexual fraud context
as unclear and difficult to apply. Moreover, the standard in Al-Rawi and
GF is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s description in R v (A)J of
“meaningful consent” and is insufficiently protective of women’s sexual
integrity and the right of everyone to make meaningful choices about their
sexual activities.
Building on the previous section, Part 5 articulates a legal standard
for capacity to consent and its application by courts that would be
more protective of severely intoxicated individuals. A capacity standard
should include the ability to understand the context specific risks and
consequences of engaging in the sexual activity in question. A more robust
legal standard for capacity would encourage judges to give more weight to
evidence of severe intoxication short of unconsciousness. Part 5 suggests
that judges must do more than articulate this standard. They must apply it
to the evidence before them. This may require, in part, further excavation
and disruption of our stereotypical assumptions about drunk women and
sex.
2. Adding Unconsciousness to Section 273.1(2) Was an
Unnecessary and Illogical Revision to the Criminal Code
In order to understand the problems with the federal government’s recent
revisions to the Criminal Code and recent appellate decisions in Nova
Scotia and Ontario, it is useful to first consider the legislative framework
for the criminal law definition of consent to sexual touching, as well as how
8
9

Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1.
GF, supra note 6 at para 37.
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it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada. The legislative
framework is found in sections 265(3) and 273.1 of the Criminal Code.10
In R v Hutchinson, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the twostage process for analyzing consent to sexual touching as set out in the
Criminal Code.11 The first step—which is found in section 273.1(1)—
involves determining whether the complainant did not voluntarily consent
to the sexual activity in question. The second step of the analysis requires
an assessment of whether the complainant’s voluntary agreement was
not legally effective. Section 265(3) enumerates circumstances in which
a complainant’s voluntary agreement will not be legally effective, such
as consent vitiated by fraud. Section 273.1(2) also identifies some of the
circumstances in which a complainant’s voluntary agreement will not be
legally effective—one such circumstance being because the complainant
lacked the capacity to consent to the sexual activity in question.
The first stage of the analysis, whether the complainant voluntarily
agreed to the sexual activity in question under section 273.1(1), encompasses
consideration of three factors: did the complainant voluntarily agree to
engage in the specific physical act at issue, with knowledge that the act
was of a sexual nature (for example, that it was a sexual act not a medical
exam), and awareness of the identity of the individual with whom the
sexual contact occurred.12
If the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant
did not voluntarily agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity
10

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].
R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 at para 4 [Hutchinson].
12
Ibid at para 57. The Hutchinson majority’s description of the two-stage
framework established by the Criminal Code encourages a problematic application of
the law of consent not directly related to the issue of capacity. See Lise Gotell, “Thinly
Construing the Nature of the Act Legally Consented To: The Corrosive Impact of R v
Hutchinson On the Law of Consent” (2020) 53:1 UBC L Rev 53. Lise Gotell demonstrates
how an unduly narrow understanding of the ‘specific physical act at issue’ at stage one of
the analysis will result in legal reasoning that expects women to prevent sexual violence
and that holds complainants responsible for the sexual harms that they have suffered. As
Gotell notes, an interpretation of the physical act at issue which fails to include factors
such as the degree of force used or whether the voluntary agreement was contingent on
the use of a condom is not sufficiently protective of the complainant’s sexual integrity
and personal autonomy. Nor, as the minority in Hutchinson, supra note 11 noted, is it
consistent with the definition of consent established in R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330,
169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk cited to SCR]. Whether a complainant voluntarily agreed to
the sexual act at issue is based on her subjective state of mind at the time the sexual touching
occurred. Take the example of condom use. A woman whose voluntarily agreement to
engage in sexual intercourse was contingent on the use of a condom cannot be said to
have, as a subjective matter, voluntarily agreed to sexual intercourse which occurred after
11
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of the individual touching her, then lack of consent is established.13 The
consent analysis is complete. The (lack of) consent element of the actus
reus for the offence of sexual assault is satisfied.
However, if the evidence suggests that the complainant did voluntarily
agree to the sexual activity in question or there is a reasonable doubt as to
her lack of agreement, then the second stage of the analysis is applied.
The second stage asks: are there circumstances, such as those enumerated
under sections 265(3) and 273.1(2), which render the complainant’s
supposed voluntary agreement, or apparent consent, legally ineffective?
Under the Criminal Code’s framework, the complainant’s capacity to
consent is not assessed until this second stage of the analysis. In other
words, the issue of capacity only arises in cases in which the evidence
demonstrates voluntary agreement or raises a reasonable doubt as to the
complainant’s involuntariness.14
In December 2018, the Criminal Code definition of consent to sexual
touching was revised for the first time in more than 25 years.15 One of
the amendments under Bill C-51 added a provision to the Criminal Code
stipulating that an unconscious person is incapable of consenting.16
This newly added section (section 273.1(2)(a.1)) states that “no consent
is obtained if … the complainant is unconscious.”17 Parliament’s stated
purpose for this amendment was to codify the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the case of R v (A)J.18 This revision to the Criminal
Code was unnecessary. There is no indication in the reported caselaw that
trial judges were struggling with how to apply this aspect of the decision
in JA. It is clear that trial judges in Canada consistently recognized that
an unconscious person cannot consent to sexual activity. There have
the accused surreptitiously removed the condom. Some lower courts have refused to find
that there was voluntary agreement where consent was contingent on the use of a condom
and the accused removed the condom without consent: see R v Rivera, 2019 ONSC 3918
at para 24; R v SY, 2017 ONCJ 798 at para 40. But this flaw in the majority’s reasoning in
Hutchinson does risk creating this type of problematic outcome. See R v Lupi, 2019 ONSC
3713 at para 31.
13
Hutchinson, supra note 11 at paras 4–5.
14
Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at 353. See also GF, supra note 6 at para 41; R v
Kishayinew, 2019 SKCA 127 at para 19.
15
Bill C-51, supra note 5.
16
Ibid, ss 10(1), 19(1).
17
Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 273.1(2)(a.1).
18
R v A(J), 2011 SCC 28 [JA]. See Bill C-51, supra note 5 and legislative Summary:
“Legislative Summary of Bill C-51: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department
of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act” (accessed 21 April
2020) online: Parliament of Canada <lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/
ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/421C51E#a29>.

76

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol. 98

been no reported cases, since JA, in which a court made the legal error of
concluding otherwise.19 One appellate court went so far as to characterize
this aspect of the legal definition of consent as axiomatic.20 The Canadian
judiciary was not confused as to whether an unconscious person could
consent to sex, making this amendment unnecessary.
In addition, given the two-stage analytical framework for consent
established under sections 273.1(1) and 273.1(2) of the Criminal Code (and
illuminated in Hutchinson), it was illogical to specify unconsciousness as a
circumstance in which apparent consent, or voluntary agreement, under
section 273.1(1) is vitiated under section 273.1(2).
Recall that section 273.1(2) is only considered if the complainant
did voluntarily agree (or there is a reasonable doubt as to whether she
did not voluntarily agree) to the sexual activity in question.21 Voluntary
agreement to the sexual activity in question means she agreed to the
specific physical act at issue, knowing both the identity of the individual
with whom the sexual contact occurred, and that it was a sexual act
(rather than, for example, a medical exam or an airport pat down).22
An unconscious person cannot voluntarily agree to be touched, nor can
they know the identity of the person touching them, nor that the contact
is of a sexual nature.23 Agreeing and knowing these facts in advance is
insufficient; consent to sexual touching must be contemporaneous.24
Thus, even if when the sexual activity commenced the complainant was in
voluntary agreement, the moment she became unconscious this voluntary
agreement, or apparent consent, vanished. In other words, if the Crown
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual contact occurred while
the complainant was unconscious, or shifting in and out of consciousness,
then the ‘lack of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question’ test
under section 273.1(1) is satisfied. The actus reus is proven.25 There is no
need following this conclusion, nor does it make sense, to then consider
the issue of capacity (or any of the other subsections of section 265(3)

19
A search of sexual assault cases since JA on CanLII, conducted on September
12, 2019, did not produce any cases in which trial judges found that sexual touching of an
unconscious complainant was consensual.
20
Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at paras 33–34.
21
Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 4.
22
Ibid at paras 4–5.
23
JA, supra note 18 at para 66.
24
Ibid. Bill C-51, supra note 5 also codified this aspect of JA; See Criminal Code,
supra note 10, s 273.1(1.1).
25
Ewanchuk, supra note 12.
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and 273.1(2) that render a complainant’s voluntary agreement legally
ineffective).26
Again, an unconscious, or intermittently conscious, complainant
cannot voluntarily agree to the sexual activity in question. It is true that
‘no consent is obtained if the complainant is unconscious’ but this is
because unconscious people cannot voluntarily agree to the sexual activity
in question, not because they lack the capacity to grant an agreement they
voluntarily provided.
Given the structure of section 273.1(1) and (2) (prior to the
amendment), and the clear direction of the Supreme Court in Hutchinson
and Ewanchuk to analyze the consent element of the actus reus as a twostage process, it was illogical to codify unconsciousness as a capacity issue
under stage two. Instead, courts should consider at stage one whether the
complainant was unconscious during some or all of the sexual touching
that occurred. Any sexual activity that occurred while the complainant
was unconscious occurred without her voluntary agreement.27 In addition
to making the analysis of consent more coherent, this would have the
added benefit of helping courts to avoid wrongly relying on evidence of
unconsciousness as the proxy for findings of incapacity, as explained in
Part 3.
More problematic than its lack of necessity and logic, this law reform
effort on the part of Parliament was a wasted opportunity to revise the
Criminal Code to clarify and improve what is an area of ambiguity and
confusion in the caselaw regarding capacity to consent: the level of
intoxication, short of unconsciousness, at which an individual lacks
capacity to consent to sexual touching.28 Even worse, and as will be
26

See e.g. Ibid at 353: “Section 265(3) identifies an additional set of circumstances
in which the accused’s conduct will be culpable. The trial judge only has to consult s. 265(3)
in those cases where the complainant has actually chosen to participate in sexual activity,
or her ambiguous conduct or submission has given rise to doubt as to the absence of
consent”.
27
Even before this unfortunate amendment to the Criminal Code some courts
failed to recognize where evidence of unconsciousness fit in this two-step framework. See
e.g. R v Cadieux, 2019 CM 2011. For a pre-Hutchinson example, see R v Ashlee, 2006 ABCA
244. Other courts, however, have properly applied this analytical framework. See e.g. Judge
Buckle’s recent decision in R v Percy, 2018 NSPC 57 at para 78 [Percy].
28
The opportunity need not have been lost. During the legislative process, Senator
Kim Pate repeatedly advocated for a definition of capacity which included the ability to
assess risks and consequences to be added to Bill C-51. While the Senate adopted Senator
Pate’s amendment to Bill C-51 it was later rejected by the House of Commons. Brian
Platt, “Despite appeals from women’s groups, Liberals reject Senate amendments to bill
on sexual consent” (11 December 2018), online: National Post <nationalpost.com/news/
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demonstrated in the next section, the unnecessary codification of the
ruling in JA, that an unconscious person is incapable of consent, risks
inadvertently reifying a problematic trend in the caselaw: the reliance on
a state of unconsciousness as the proxy for incapacity. Instead of helping
trial judges not to rely on unconsciousness as the marker of incapacity
such that the two are treated as co-extensive, this amendment to the
Criminal Code definition of consent may, by emphasizing or singling out
unconsciousness, make this mistake more likely.29
To summarize, the newly enacted section 273.1(2)(a.1)—stipulating
that no consent is obtained if the complainant is unconscious—was
both unnecessary and illogical. Unconsciousness has no place in section
273.1(2) of the Criminal Code. Most importantly, and as explained in Part
4, its inclusion in section 273.1(2) risks creating further problems with the
application of the law of consent in cases involving severely intoxicated
women.
3. The Evidentiary Threshold: Intoxication Short of
Unconsciousness Will Almost Never Result in a Finding of
Incapacity
With the exception of the newly adopted provision regarding
unconsciousness, the Criminal Code does not define what constitutes
incapacity to consent to sexual touching. This leaves it to courts to identify
and apply the threshold for capacity to consent. Courts have applied
different legal standards and have struggled to identify those circumstances,
short of unconsciousness, in which an intoxicated complainant should be
found to have lacked the capacity to grant the voluntary agreement they
provided.30 While it is clear that an unconscious individual cannot consent
to sexual touching, and that this is not where the line should be drawn,
there is inconsistency and uncertainty about what level of intoxication
does render a complainant’s voluntary agreement, or apparent consent,
legally ineffective. The result is that unconsciousness continues to serve as
the primary marker of incapacity due to intoxication.
The role that evidence of unconsciousness continues to play in
assessments of capacity—despite explicit recognition by courts that
the legal standard does not require unconsciousness—is perhaps best
politics/despite-appeals-from-womens-groups-liberals-reject-senate-amendments-tobill-on-sexual-consent>.
29
Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 273.1(2)(b). It is true that section 273.1(2)(b) of
the Criminal Code stipulates that “[no consent is obtained if] the complainant is incapable
of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in paragraph
(a.1)”. Nevertheless, the effect of the amendment is to single out unconsciousness.
30
Benedet, supra note 7.
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demonstrated by one of the most significant trends in capacity to consent
cases involving intoxication. Professor Janine Benedet’s 2010 study
revealed that, in the vast majority of cases, judges only found that a
voluntarily31 intoxicated complainant lacked capacity if she was asleep or
unconscious during some or all of the sexual touching that occurred (and
in some cases only if she was asleep or unconscious at the time the sexual
activity commenced).32 A review of the past ten years of caselaw, since
Benedet’s study was conducted, reveals a similar pattern.33 While there
are exceptions, cases involving intoxicated complainants tend to only
result in convictions on the basis of lack of capacity to consent if there is
evidence that the complainant was asleep or unconscious during some or
all of the sexual touching that occurred.34 In many of these convictions the
evidence demonstrated an expressed lack of voluntary agreement on the
part of the complainant, in addition to the evidence of unconsciousness.35
In other words, in most of the cases in which an accused is convicted of
non-consensual sexual touching involving an intoxicated woman, the
complainant’s evidence was that she regained consciousness or awoke

31

Ibid. Benedet identified an important distinction between cases involving
voluntarily intoxicated complainants and those that were drugged. Courts were more
likely to find incapacity if the complainant was involuntarily intoxicated. As she notes,
findings of incapacity should not turn on whether the complainant’s intoxication was
voluntary. That they do suggests that victim blaming stereotypes might be operating in
those cases in which the complainant chose to consume intoxicating substances.
32
Ibid.
33
A search was conducted of the CanLII database for all sexual assault cases
between January 2010 and November 2019 in which the issue of capacity was raised, or
the complainant’s level of intoxication, voluntary or involuntary, was discussed. Over 250
cases were examined.
34
For cases in which findings of incapacity were made (all of which involved
evidence that the complainant was unconscious or asleep for all or some part of the
incident) see e.g. Percy, supra note 27; R v Joe, 2010 YKTC 134; R v CL, 2017 ONSC 3202; R
v James, 2013 BCCA 159; R v JLW, 2011 ABPC 255; R v Tweneboah-Koduah, 2017 ONSC
640, aff’d 2018 ONCA 570 [Tweneboah]; R v Smarch, 2013 YKTC 114; R v Rosenthal, 2014
YKTC 35; R v Ransom, 2011 NWTSC 33; Randall v R, 2012 NBCA 25; R v WAR, 2013
BCSC 1767; R v BLP, 2011 ABCA 384 [BLP]; R v Ningiuk, 2017 NUCJ 06; R v Mitrovic,
2017 ONSC 1829 [Mitrovic]; R v McNab, 2010 SKQB 169 [McNab]; R v McLean, 2014
BCSC 1293; R v Gai, 2014 ABPC 158; R v Cubillan, 2015 ONSC 969; R v SAA, 2014 ONCJ
261. But see R v FBP, 2016 ONCJ 860; Tariq, supra note 2. (In these cases, the accused was
convicted on the basis of strong evidence of extreme intoxication but which did not include
evidence of lack of consciousness). In R v CL, 2017 ONSC 3202 at para 104, the accused
was convicted on the basis that the complainant, who had been unconscious within a very
short time period before the sexual touching, was “not totally asleep” but was “very drunk,
barely conscious and blacking out”.
35
See e.g. Tweneboah, supra note 34; R v Stewart, 2012 YKSC 75; BLP, supra note
34; Mitrovic, supra note 34; McNab, supra note 34.
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to find herself being sexually assaulted by the accused and that she,
at that point, attempted to resist verbally or physically. In several cases
this resistance upon awaking was met with significant physical violence
perpetrated against the complainant by the accused.36
What happens in cases in which there is no evidence that the severely
intoxicated complainant was unconscious when the sexual touching
occurred?
A) Some judges explicitly, but erroneously, require evidence
of unconsciousness to find incapacity
The most obvious problem occurs in cases in which judges explicitly
determine that lack of sufficient evidence of unconsciousness raises a
reasonable doubt regarding incapacity. In two recent cases, courts of
appeal have overturned trial decisions to acquit on the basis of this error.37
In R v WLS, the accused’s 11-year-old son testified that he witnessed his
father drag his maternal aunt from her bedroom into the living room
while she was asleep, undress her, and sexually assault her repeatedly.38
Judge Moher acquitted the accused on the basis that lack of consent had
not been proven because “‘unconsciousness’ was [not] the only reasonable
inference available on the evidence.”39 In affirming the Court of Appeal of
Alberta’s decision to overturn the acquittal, the Supreme Court of Canada
stated: “[i]n our view, the act of dragging the complainant while asleep and
drugged is inconsistent with any sort of consent.”40 As the Court noted, it
is an error of law to conclude that nothing short of unconsciousness will
amount to incapacity.41
The same type of error was overturned by the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal in R v Al-Rawi. Al-Rawi involved allegations of sexual assault
against a Halifax taxi driver who was found by the police in his cab late
at night with an unconscious and naked from the breasts down woman
passenger. He was in between her legs with his pants undone and partially
lowered. There was a condom on the console in the front seat. The
complainant had urinated in her clothing and had no memory of what
occurred. Al-Rawi was acquitted.42 On appeal, Justice Beveridge agreed
36

See e.g. R v Roberts, 2016 NWTSC 47.
R v WLS, 2018 ABCA 363 [WLS (ABCA)]; Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1.
38
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with the Crown that the trial judge had erred by “equat[ing] incapacity
only with unconsciousness.”43
In R v M(RN) the 20-year-old complainant, who was described by
her parents as less mature and sophisticated than other young women
her age, spent the weekend drinking alcohol at the 45-year-old accused’s
residence.44 The trial judge dismissed the issue of incapacity on this basis:
The issue of whether she had the capacity to consent in this particular case
therefore does not arise because in light of the evidence of the complainant as I
have reviewed it, I find that her assertion that she did not consent is not reliable.
There is, as pointed out by Ms. Adams, no suggestion on the evidence that at
the particular time when she became aware of the act that she was apparently
unconscious, and her evidence is that she was conscious at that particular time.45

Judge Baird Ellan’s reasons erroneously imply that a finding of incapacity
requires evidence that the complainant was unconscious at the time the
sexual touching occurred. The complainant’s evidence was that she awoke
to find the accused penetrating her and that she recalled trying to say ‘no’,
but that she was half asleep and drunk and “couldn’t really do anything.”46
Having found she had a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant’s
absence of consent, Judge Baird Ellan should have considered whether
her possible apparent consent was legally ineffective due to her level of
intoxication. In assessing this, she should have looked at more than just
whether there was evidence she was unconscious at the time of the sexual
touching.47
In the preceding cases, unconsciousness and incapacity were
conflated such that the court treated them as co-extensive. Another type
of error related to the sufficiency of evidence occurs when trial judges
use unconsciousness as the reference point or evidentiary proxy for the
capacity threshold.
B) In some cases (lack of) unconsciousness is relied upon as
the evidentiary proxy for identifying incapacity
In some cases, judges correctly note that unconsciousness is not the only
state in which lack of capacity due to intoxication may be found, but their

43
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Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 116.
R v M (RN), 2011 BCPC 199 at paras 4–8 [MRN].
Ibid at para 89.
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Ibid at paras 88–89.

82

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol. 98

analysis of the evidence of intoxication suggests that they may nevertheless
be relying on unconsciousness as a type of proxy to identify incapacity.48
In R v TJ, evidence of the 18-year-old complainant’s state of
intoxication included her testimony that she had experienced an alcoholinduced blackout, testimony from a friend who described her as “very
intoxicated” and “slurring [her] words,” and evidence from the accused
that she had vomited on her clothing.49 With the exception of her loss
of memory (which he treated not as circumstantial evidence of lack of
capacity but as a detriment to the Crown’s case on the issue of consent),
Justice de Sa’s capacity analysis made no mention of any of this evidence
of her level of intoxication. Instead he focussed on the lack of evidence of
unconsciousness. He highlighted the Crown’s acknowledgment that there
was no evidence that the complainant was unconscious or incapacitated
on the way back from the party.50 He noted the complainant’s memory of
observing the accused on top of her having intercourse, just before turning
her head to the side and closing her eyes.51 He concluded that
to rely on this evidence of the complainant to conclude she was unconscious at this
specific time would be dangerous in my view. I have no context for this memory,
or any understanding of where in the sexual encounter it may have taken place …
The complainant has no actual memory of the events, nor is there any meaningful
evidence indicating she lacked the capacity to consent.52

Evidence of an alcohol-induced blackout, slurred words, and vomiting
is “meaningful evidence indicating she lacked the capacity to consent.”53
Whether this evidence established lack of capacity beyond a reasonable
doubt is a separate (and in this case unanswered) question. The point is
that Justice de Sa does not appear to have given it any weight, and instead
focussed his capacity analysis on what he deemed to be insufficient
evidence of unconsciousness.
In some cases, courts identify evidence of apparent consent, highlight
the lack of evidence of unconsciousness, and then stop the analysis without
assessing whether the evidence of extreme intoxication establishes lack
of capacity. This type of reasoning also seems to be relying upon lack of
48
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evidence of unconsciousness as the reference point for incapacity.54 For
example, in R v Bisaillon the police found the complainant on the grass
outside the accused’s apartment at 3:42 a.m. with the accused on top
of her.55 Neither was wearing pants, nor underwear. She was unable to
maintain her balance. Justice Blouin commented that “she was conscious
but intoxicated and when asked whether she wanted to be there her answer
was unintelligible.”56 She had no memory of these events. According to the
decision, “[t]he Crown led a significant body of evidence which suggested
the complainant was extremely intoxicated.”57 A toxicologist testified that
her blood alcohol content would have been between 201 and 278 at the
time of the incident. Even the accused’s evidence was that she “was pretty
drunk.”58 He testified that he had to help her up to sit on a patio chair after
she fell and hit her head on a concrete step. All three police officers who
attended the scene that early morning testified to her “disoriented state,
her inability to stand unaided, her slurred speech and incoherence, her
extreme intoxication.”59
The accused was acquitted on the basis that the Crown failed to prove
absence of consent. Justice Blouin based his decision on the evidence of
two other witnesses. One of these witnesses testified that the complainant
and the accused had been flirting and kissing and that the complainant
seemed “all over him.”60 The other witness testified that from his balcony
he saw a naked woman on top of a man on the grass and that she appeared
to be “leading” the sexual activity.61
This evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to whether there
was voluntary agreement or apparent consent. The problem with Justice
Blouin’s reasoning is that he should have, in light of this evidence and
conclusion, fully considered the second stage of the analysis. He failed to
properly assess whether this apparent consent was legally effective given
the complainant’s level of intoxication.
In R v C(K), the 15-year-old complainant and 16-year-old accused
attended the same party on the date of the complainant’s 15th birthday.62
54
See e.g. R v Bisaillon, 2014 ONCJ 577 [Bisaillon]; R v MLF (2013), BCPC 0183;
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She testified that at the party, the accused approached her repeatedly.
Eventually she agreed to follow him to his truck, which was locked.
According to her, they walked away from the party to a secluded area. She
alleged that the accused then placed her on the ground, removed her pants
and penetrated her vaginally with his penis. He did not use a condom.63
The complainant testified that when they left the party, prior to the
alleged sexual assault, she was stumbling and slurring her words. She
estimated that her level of intoxication at that point was an eight or nine
out of ten. When she returned to the party she was upset, her thong
underwear was on the outside of her pants.
The complainant’s friend testified that the complainant was at a level
of intoxication of approximately eight or nine out of ten and that she
got progressively drunker as the party went on. She stated that she went
with the complainant to the bathroom after the incident and witnessed
her “puking up leaves.”64 She said the complainant’s underwear was on
outside of her pants; she was stumbling; she had to hold herself up to keep
her balance; and she had an impaired ability to speak.65 A third friend also
testified that the complainant’s level of intoxication by the end of the party
was an eight out of ten.66
In his decision to acquit, Judge Norheim accepted that the 15-yearold complainant was “highly intoxicated,”67 “significantly affected by
alcohol”68 and that she had consumed a “large amount of liquor.”69 Despite
the evidence of two other witnesses that she was an eight or nine out of
ten on the scale of intoxication, and the evidence of one of those witnesses
that she was stumbling, unable to keep her balance, had reappeared at
the party with her underwear on outside of her pants, and was vomiting
up leaves directly following the incident, Judge Norheim determined
that there were no grounds to vitiate consent. He noted that there was no
“substantiated evidence” that she was staggering and slurring her words
prior to the incident and that the brief video clip introduced by the Crown
“showed her walking in a relatively normal fashion immediately before
the sexual encounter.”70
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Ibid at paras 54, 62.
Ibid at para 69.
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Judge Norheim’s discussion of the caselaw on the issue of capacity
was as follows, “[t]he authorities establish that if the complainant is drunk
to the point of unconsciousness she cannot consent to sexual activity from
that unconscious state. I have found no authority which directs that a
person under the influence of alcohol cannot consent to sexual activity.”71
The only authorities he relied on were R v (A)J and R v Ashlee.72 In both
JA and Ashlee the complainant was unconscious. This was the extent of
his treatment of the jurisprudence on capacity. While he did concede that
“there may be cases where the evidence establishes that a person was so
intoxicated that they were unable to give consent,”73 he determined that
this was not one of them.74
Reflective of the paradox that complainants who were intoxicated at
the time of the sexual incident often face, Judge Norheim concluded that,
“the consumption of alcohol has affected the reliability of her memory.
However, the evidence tends to show a functioning mind and a conscious,
if somewhat reckless decision, to accompany the defendant.”75 Too drunk
to be believed, not drunk enough to lack capacity.
In R v Tariq, a case that has been cited numerous times since its 2016
release,76 Justice Greene reviews the caselaw on capacity to consent.77
Some of the cases cited with approval by Justice Greene in Tariq articulate
a shockingly onerous evidentiary burden resulting in a shockingly low
standard for capacity to consent to sexual touching. For example, she
states that “[t]he extreme level of intoxication that is required to prove
incapacity to consent was recently illustrated … in R v Hinds [2016] OJ No
71
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257 (SCJ).”78 She notes that the complainant in Hinds was “so impaired
that she was unable to dress herself” and that according to another witness
she “looked blank at times and was zigzagging.”79 The trial judge in Hinds
found that the Crown had not proven incapacity.
In Justice Greene’s view, “this judgment establishes just how intoxicated
one must be to lose capacity to consent.”80 She states that “[c]ases where
extreme intoxication have led to findings of incapacity to consent tend
to be cases where the evidence of intoxication is far beyond the loss of
gross motor skills and balance. These cases tend to include evidence of
a loss of awareness or loss of consciousness.”81 Indeed, a woman whose
level of intoxication is far beyond the loss of gross motor skills likely is
unconscious.82 The toxicologist in Al-Rawi explained the progression of
intoxication as follows:
A low blood alcohol concentration, meaning up to 150 milligrams percent, is
associated with talkativeness, sociability, euphoria, and muscle relaxation. There
is deterioration in mental functioning such as judgement, attention, perception
and comprehension. There is an increase in risk-taking behaviour and in selfconfidence.
At a blood alcohol concentration of 150 milligrams percent, the effects of
alcohol become more numerous and pronounced … The individual may display
gross motor incoordination, meaning slurred speech, staggering gait, motor
incoordination and emotional disturbances. Intoxication is an advanced state of
impairment such that the outward physical signs of the deteriorating effects of
alcohol become apparent.
A blood alcohol concentration of 250 milligrams percent is associated with severe
intoxication, meaning marked muscular incoordination, an inability to stand
or walk, as well as feelings of apathy and ataxia, meaning loss of motor control.
There may also be exaggerated emotional states as well as incontinence or loss of
consciousness.83
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Justice Greene’s suggestion that a finding of incapacity must be based
on evidence of intoxication far beyond loss of gross motor skills, such
as evidence of loss of awareness or consciousness, is essentially an
instruction to courts to use unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy for
lack of capacity. While she did not rely on unconsciousness as the proxy
for incapacity in Tariq,84 and she was correct that this is what courts have
typically demanded before making a finding of incapacity, requiring
evidence of intoxication far beyond the loss (not the impairment but the
loss) of gross motor skills sets the threshold too low. It sets the evidentiary
standard at bare consciousness. As a practical matter, stipulating that
findings of incapacity cannot be made without evidence of intoxication far
beyond the loss of gross motor skills, such as evidence of unconsciousness
or loss of awareness, is no different than concluding that the legal standard
for incapacity is unconsciousness.
In addition to being unnecessary, enumerating unconsciousness,
and only unconsciousness, as a circumstance in which “no consent is
obtained” might inadvertently perpetuate this problem. It is true that
the Criminal Code now clearly stipulates that unconsciousness is not
the only state in which incapacity will be found.85 However, given that
unconsciousness is the only guidance Parliament gives on conditions of
incapacity, the 2018 Criminal Code amendment may encourage judges to
continue to rely inexplicitly on lack of consciousness as the evidentiary
proxy for incapacity.
C) Requiring evidence of unconsciousness as the
evidentiary proxy for incapacity fails to distinguish between
complainants with lowered inhibitions and loss of inhibitions
Justice Greene states in Tariq that, based on the caselaw, courts cannot
conclude incapacity to consent from the mere fact that the complainant is
effectively “falling down drunk.”86 The failure to find incapacity in cases
with this level of intoxication may flow, in part, from a lack of distinction
between someone with relaxed or lowered inhibitions and impaired gross
motor skills and someone with no inhibition, someone who has lost the
ability to control themselves.
In Tariq Justice Greene commented, “[h]aving sexual intercourse
with someone whose inhibitions are relaxed due to the consumption
84
Tariq, supra note 2 at para 30. Justice Greene did make a finding of incapacity
without evidence of unconsciousness. However, in that case there was substantial videotape
evidence of the severely intoxicated complainant including evidence of the complainant in
an elevator being held up by the accused, with her eyes closed, and appearing to fall asleep.
85
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of alcohol is not a crime. Some might find this conduct unethical. But
our law does not criminalize unethical conduct.”87 It seems obvious
that having sex with someone whose “inhibitions are relaxed due to the
consumption of alcohol” ought not to inspire the imposition of a criminal
law sanction. As Justice Greene implies, not everyone would even find this
to be unethical, let alone criminal, sexual conduct. But lowered inhibition
and lack of inhibition are not the same thing. The cases being critiqued
here involve women who were severely intoxicated—women who were
slurring their speech, unable to dress themselves properly, vomiting, and/
or falling down—not women whose inhibitions were simply ‘relaxed’.
In many cases, including Tariq, courts have relied upon the
statement in R v Cedeno that “[m]ere drunkenness is not the equivalent of
incapacity. Nor is alcohol-induced imprudent decision making, memory
loss, loss of inhibitions or self control.”88 Of course mere drunkenness is
not the equivalent of incapacity. But nor is imprudent decision-making
equivalent to loss of self-control. How can an individual who has lost
control of themselves have the capacity to make a meaningful choice to
have sex? If these decisions are genuinely referring to someone who has
lost the ability to control themselves (rather than implicitly invoking the
stereotype that drunken women will have sex with anyone), it makes little
sense to liken imprudent decision-making with loss of self-control. Courts
must be careful not to equate very different levels of cognition through
imprecise wording. Regardless, Cedeno is not a helpful precedent to
rely on in assessing these distinctions. The complainant in Cedeno was
unconscious when the sexual touching occurred. The issue in that case,
as Justice Duncan recognized, was whether the Crown had proven lack
of voluntary agreement, not whether the complainant lacked capacity.89
That consumption of alcohol causes lowered inhibitions and risktaking behavior is often highlighted in capacity to consent cases.90 Judges
in some cases raise the prospect of complainants who, with lowered
inhibitions due to alcohol consumption, consent to sex that they would
not have agreed to if sober.91 Decreased inhibitions and diminished
judgment are among the first clinical signs of alcohol influence.92 In other
87
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words, these symptoms occur at the early stages of alcohol intoxication,
before mental confusion, vomiting, significantly slurred speech, and loss
of gross motor skills.93 In cases involving evidence that a complainant
was ‘falling down drunk’, judicial emphasis on ‘mere drunkenness’ and
sober second thoughts of post-sex regret suggests a failure to recognize
the significant distinction between alcohol induced ‘relaxed inhibitions’
and loss of control of, or inability to protect, oneself. A number of factors
inform the relationship between blood alcohol content, outward signs of
intoxication, and cognitive capacity. Even with evidence of blood alcohol
content at the time of the incident, toxicologists are typically unable to
draw definitive conclusions regarding a complainant’s level of capacity
in relation to her consumption of alcohol—unless she was unconscious.
This uncertainty contributes to the challenges in this area of sexual
assault law. Precise knowledge of the relationship between blood alcohol
content, symptoms of intoxication, and cognitive capacity is unavailable.
However, the stages of intoxication—in terms of the symptoms caused by
progressive levels of alcohol influence—are described fairly consistently
by toxicologists and alcohol scientists.94 Decisions that do not distinguish
between these different stages have not appropriately assessed the issue of
capacity.
Judges should not conflate the feelings of euphoria, increased
confidence, and relaxed inhibitions symptomatic of the early stages of
intoxication with the vomiting, slurred speech, mental confusion and
loss of gross motor skills that occurs in individuals who are conscious but
extremely intoxicated.95 Courts must attend carefully to the distinctions
between impaired judgment and loss of judgment, impaired gross motor
skills and loss of gross motor skills. Imprudent decision making fuelled
by the increased confidence and risk-taking behavior symptomatic of
early stage intoxication should not be equated with the loss of self-control
experienced by those who are severely intoxicated. While Justice Greene
appears to have identified these distinctions in her analysis of the facts in
Tariq, her treatment of the case law 96—her emphasis on ‘just how drunk
a woman needs to be’—was not helpful in this regard.97
assault by a defendant”. Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42; KC, supra note 4; Percy, supra note
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In cases in which the complainant has little or no memory of what
occurred, making an after-the-fact determination of her level of capacity
while intoxicated will often require relying on some form of evidentiary
proxy. She cannot give direct evidence of her level of cognition because she
does not remember. Moreover, absent evidence of blood or urine alcohol
concentration (which is not always available) the evidence of intoxication
typically introduced in sexual assault proceedings is circumstantial
evidence of intoxication (such as vomiting, loss of gross motor skills,
or unconsciousness). Even evidence of blood alcohol concentration,
which is direct evidence of intoxication, is far from direct evidence of a
complainant’s cognitive capacity. In other words, judges are frequently
required to make capacity findings by assessing circumstantial evidence of
intoxication as a proxy for cognitive ability (or capacity). This, of course,
raises the question: a proxy to determine what? The weight to be given
particular evidence of intoxication—the value of the evidentiary proxy so
to speak—turns on the legal standard for capacity. The lower the legal
standard for capacity—the closer it is to bare consciousness—the more
onerous the evidentiary requirement.
While capacity to consent to sexual touching is frequently
characterized by courts as an exclusively factual matter,98 common law
assertions of ‘just how intoxicated a woman must be’ before a court will
conclude that she lacked capacity reveal an underlying policy position
regarding the level of protection our criminal law ought to afford
intoxicated complainants. Whether an intoxicated individual has the level
of sobriety to meet a particular capacity standard is, indeed, a question of
fact. However, underpinning this question of fact is a legal question: What
is the standard of capacity required by law? Determining this standard is a
policy decision. The level of sobriety our criminal law should require—the
standard itself—is as much a norm-driven, policy decision as is adopting
a prohibition on sexual interactions with individuals below a certain level
of maturity.
The legal standard for capacity to consent described by the Supreme
Court in JA supports rejecting the evidentiary approach articulated in cases
like Tariq in favour of an assessment that is more protective of severely
intoxicated women and more reproachful of the individuals who sexually
exploit them. Consent, as determined by the majority of the Supreme
Court in JA, requires a conscious, “‘capable’ or operating mind”—one that
is capable of granting, revoking or withholding consent to each and every

lacked capacity. In that case there was evidence she was unconscious, had vomited on
herself, and was unable to speak or walk proximate in time to the sexual activity.
98
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sexual act.99 A complainant must have the ability to decide, at each and
every point of sexual contact, whether and on what terms she is willing to
engage in the activity. She must be able to evaluate each and every sexual
activity or encounter; and she must be able to change her mind partway
and withdraw her earlier consent.100
It seems highly unlikely that individuals at the level of intoxication
described in the cases cited in Tariq, women whose symptoms of
intoxication go far beyond loss of gross motor skills, would be capable
of deciding at each and every point of a sexual encounter whether and
on what terms they are willing to engage in the sexual act at issue. A legal
standard for capacity that is informed by the principles articulated in JA
should encourage courts to place weight on evidence of outward signs
of severe impairment such as loss of gross motor skills, vomiting, loss of
bladder control, and significantly impaired speech, instead of relying on
unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy for incapacity.
4. The Legal Standard: The Threshold Established by the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi Fails to Sufficiently
Protect the Sexual Integrity of Intoxicated Women
The caselaw establishing the legal standard for capacity to consent to
sexual touching is inconsistent.101 Different jurisdictions (or courts within
them) articulate different thresholds. The standard has been described as
the capacity to understand the risks and consequences associated with the
activity,102 the ability to understand and agree,103 or something more than
the ability to execute baseline physical functions.104
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet provided lower courts with
clear guidance on how to assess capacity to consent to sexual touching in
the context of intoxication. JA is helpful but it did not involve an intoxicated
99
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complainant. Nor, as discussed in Part 2, has Parliament provided
sufficient guidance. Unfortunately, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s
recent decision in R v Al-Rawi has become the case to which other courts,
including the Court of Appeal for Ontario,105 are now turning.106 This is
unfortunate because there are significant flaws with the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal’s reasoning in Al-Rawi. The legal standard for capacity adopted
in Al-Rawi offers extremely intoxicated, but conscious, women very little
protection under the criminal law.
Recall that the original trial decision in Al-Rawi was overturned
because Judge Lenehan equated lack of capacity with unconsciousness.
The problems with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision in AlRawi do not relate to its treatment of the trial judgment in this case.
Rather, it is the legal standard Justice Beveridge adopted for determining
incapacity, and his application of the precedents he marshalled in support
of this standard, that are problematic. The legal standard for incapacity
articulated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi is as follows:
[a] complainant lacks the requisite capacity to consent if … the complainant did
not have an operating mind capable of:
1) appreciating the nature and quality of the sexual activity; or
2) knowing the identity of the person or persons wishing to engage in the sexual
activity; or
3) understanding she could agree or decline to engage in, or to continue, the
sexual activity.107

In adopting this test, Justice Beveridge relied on the body of case law
addressing sexual fraud. His language of “the nature and quality of
the sexual activity” at issue is borrowed directly from the sexual fraud
caselaw.108 Relying on the law of sexual fraud to establish a standard for
105
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jurisprudence for the standard for capacity.
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capacity to consent was an unprecedented shift in the doctrinal approach
to capacity.109 It is not clear that the principles and legal test developed
to establish criminal prohibitions on deceptive sex should govern the
criminal law’s standard for capacity to consent. Certainly the factual
context and policy implications associated with these two areas of sexual
assault law seem different. Regardless, three failings in particular should
be highlighted in Justice Beveridge’s decision in Al-Rawi.
First, a legal standard for capacity to consent that is based on the
capacity to appreciate the ‘nature and quality of the sexual activity’
establishes an extremely low legal threshold for capacity. Second, devising
a threshold based on a broad, adjectival standard like ‘the nature and
quality of the sexual act’ creates an illusive and confusing standard that
courts have struggled to apply. Third, a standard that focuses on whether
one understands that they can say ‘yes or no’, rather than on whether one
has the capacity to give meaningful consent, encourages courts to conclude
that any evidence of non-consent is dispositive of the issue of capacity—
even if such evidence is not sufficient to establish lack of voluntariness
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A) A standard based on the ‘nature and quality of the sexual
activity’ rather than the risks and consequences it presents
creates an inappropriately low threshold for capacity
The language of ‘the nature and quality of the sexual activity’ used in
Justice Beveridge’s decision is, as noted, borrowed from the sexual
fraud caselaw. At common law, prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in R v Cuerrier, an accused’s deception would only vitiate consent
if the deception went to the nature and quality of the sexual activity.110
In Cuerrier, an aggravated assault case involving the non-disclosure
of HIV positive status, the Court highlighted the very narrow scope of
the common law interpretation of the “nature and quality of the sexual
109

There are numerous, frequently cited, decisions from trial and appellate courts
across Canada involving interpretations of the standard for capacity to consent. None
of these decisions turn to the law of sexual fraud to determine the appropriate standard
for capacity to consent. See e.g. R v Jensen, 90 OAC 183, 1996 CanLII 1237 (Ont CA)
[Jensen cited to CanLII]; Tariq, supra note 2; Haraldson, supra note 104; Siddiqui, supra
note 102; AA, supra note 102 at para 9; R v JWM, 2004 CarswellOnt 1214 (WL Can),
[2004] OJ No 1295 (QL) (Sup Ct); R v Hinds, 2016 ONSC 95. While it is true that courts in
capacity cases have looked to Hutchinson, supra note 11, a sexual fraud case, for the overall
analytical framework for consent, this is much different than relying on the old common
law definition of sexual fraud to determine the definition of incapacity.
110 R v Petrozzi (1987), 13 BCLR (2d) 273, 1987 CanLII 2786 (CA); Cuerrier, supra
note 108 at 421.
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activity.”111 A fraud with respect to the presence of sexually transmitted
infections,112 or the fact that one of the individuals present was a voyeur,
not a medical intern,113 or that the accused held himself out to be a faith
healer in order to seduce the complainant,114 would not go to the nature
and quality of the act. According to its common law interpretation, the
nature and quality of the sexual act refers to the specifics regarding the
physical act itself.115 For example, inserting a penis into a complainant’s
vagina when what she consented to was penetration with a finger would go
to the nature and quality of the act. However, the nature and quality of the
act would not include someone’s HIV positive status or the fact that they
had gonorrhea.116 This is why, in the context of sexual fraud, the Supreme
Court of Canada established an additional circumstance in which apparent
consent will be vitiated by fraud. In addition to deceptions that go to the
nature and quality of the sexual act, ones that result in a significant risk
of serious bodily harm may also vitiate voluntary agreement or apparent
consent.117
Again, according to a long line of sexual fraud cases in which the
phrase has been interpreted, the nature and quality of the sexual activity
refers only to the basic physical act and its sexual nature. Unless the
nature and quality of the act standard is to be interpreted differently in the
context of capacity to consent than it has been in the jurisprudence from
which this standard was drawn, Justice Beveridge’s inability to “appreciate
the nature and quality of the activity” threshold for a finding of incapacity
creates an extremely low standard. Indeed, he refers to it as a standard of
“only a ‘minimal capacity.’”118
Al-Rawi is not the first decision to employ the language of minimal
capacity. The case most frequently cited, and one that was relied upon
by Justice Beveridge, is R v Jensen.119 It is true that in Jensen the Court of
Appeal for Ontario concluded that the complainant in that case should
not have been found to lack the “minimal capacity” necessary to consent
111

Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 410; See R v Maurantonio, [1968] 1 OR 145, 65 DLR
(2d) 674 (CA), in which the majority concluded that pretending to be a doctor conducting
vaginal exams did go to the nature and quality of the act. The complainants thought they
were consenting to a medical procedure. See Mabior, supra note 108.
112 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 425; R v Clarence (1888), 22 QBD 23 (Eng QB)
(failure to disclose gonorrhea) [Clarence].
113 Bolduc v The Queen, [1967] SCR 677, 63 DLR (2d) 82 [Bolduc].
114 R v Ramos, 1997 CanLII 1425 at para 11, 101 OAC 211 (Ont CA).
115 Clarence, supra note 112; Bolduc, supra note 113.
116 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 412, 424 –25; Hutchinson, supra note 11.
117 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 424, 428, 432.
118 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 59.
119 Jensen, supra note 109.
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to sex.120 However, the Court in Jensen also said the following, “[s]he
was sufficiently aware that she was able to make decisions and act upon
them.”121 A level of awareness sufficient to ‘make decisions’ (plural) may
suggest a standard that is higher than the one proposed in Al-Rawi. Not
only that, in Jensen, the complainant herself testified that she was alert,
knew what was going on and expressed her non-consent repeatedly.122
The Court in Jensen was not grappling with an extremely intoxicated
woman who was conscious enough to understand that she was being
touched sexually but aware of little, if anything, else.
In Al-Rawi, Justice Beveridge suggests that the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in R v (A)J supports a standard of ‘only a minimal
capacity’ because Chief Justice McLachlin concluded in that case that
“Parliament intended consent to mean the conscious consent of an
operating mind.”123 This interpretation of JA seems wrong. First, Chief
Justice McLachlin was referring to the difference between a conscious
and unconscious mind, making this particular passage from JA an
inappropriate one to rely on in establishing the minimum threshold for
capacity (unless one seeks to draw the line at unconsciousness).
Second, whether requiring an ‘operating mind’ can or should be
equated with a standard of minimal capacity is not self-evident. An
operating mind may very well require more than the minimal capacity
needed to know that one is being, for example, vaginally penetrated with
a penis, and that this is a sexual act to which one could say no. Under a
nature and quality of the sexual activity standard for capacity that would
be the extent of awareness/understanding required. Instead, to have an
‘operating mind’ sufficient to grant consent to sex may well require the
capacity to assess something further, such as the risks and consequences
of the sexual activity in question.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s conclusion in JA was that Parliament
was concerned with ensuring that individuals have the capacity to give
“meaningful consent.”124 It seems reasonable to suggest that the capacity
to give meaningful consent requires more than the rudimentary ability
to understand that one is, for instance, being penetrated with a penis and
that this act is a sexual one to which one could say no. The capacity to give
meaningful consent referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada in JA,
120

Ibid at 8.
Ibid at 10.
122 Ibid.
123 JA, supra note 18 at para 36: That only a “minimal capacity” suffices is supported
by comments by the Supreme Court of Canada that a complainant must have had an
“operating mind” in order to be capable of consenting to sexual activity.
124 Ibid.
121
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and this notion of minimal capacity capable of understanding the nature
and quality of the act, do not appear to establish the same legal standard.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s language of an operating mind capable of giving
meaningful consent seems more akin to the cases in which judges have
asserted that while the standard for capacity is not high, it does require
the capacity to make reasonably informed decisions. In R v JR, Justice
Ducharme described the threshold in this way, “[t]he question is whether
or not the complainant was able to make a voluntary and informed decision,
not whether she later regretted her decision or whether she would not have
made the same decision if she had been sober.”125 In R v Innes the Court
stated, “[t]here is no requirement that a complainant be a virtual robot
before she will be found to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity.
Consent requires a reasonably informed choice, freely exercised, without
interference with the freedom of a person’s will.”126 In R v Saint-Laurent,
Justice Fish stated, “[a]s a matter both of language and of law, consent
implies a reasonably informed choice, freely exercised.”127 In R v (A)A (in
discussing the capacity of complainants with intellectual disabilities), the
Court of Appeal for Ontario specified that, “no consent is obtained where
the complainant is incapable of consenting. A valid consent is an informed
consent. Therefore, the individual must be able to understand the risks
and consequences associated with the activity to be engaged in.”128
Intervenors before the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi
suggested that the standard for capacity should include: the ability to
assess the physical and social risks and consequences associated with the
act in the particular circumstance confronting the complainant.129 Courts
in several other cases have articulated a threshold that requires the ability
to assess the risks and consequences of engaging in the sexual activity in
question.130 Justice Beveridge rejected this approach. He stated, “requiring
the cognitive ability necessary to weigh the risks and consequences of
agreeing to engage in the sexual activity goes too far.”131 He offered no
reasons, examples, or explanation as to why such a standard would “go too
125

added].

R v JR, 2006 CanLII 22658 at para 43, 40 CR (6th) 97(Ont Sup Ct) [JR] [emphasis

126 R v Innes, [2004] OJ No 4150 (QL) at para 24, [2004] OTC 888 (Sup Ct)
[emphasis added].
127 R v Saint-Laurent (1993), [1994] RJQ 69, 1993 CarswellQue 2111 (WL Can) at
para 95 (CA) [Saint-Laurent cited to WL Can] [emphasis added].
128 AA, supra note 102 at para 9 [emphasis added] (capacity in this case related to
the complainant’s intellectual disability).
129 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 36 (LEAF Factum).
130 See e.g. Siddiqui, supra note 102; AA, supra note 102; JR, supra note 125; R v
Zadeh, 2015 BCPC 192.
131 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 61.
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far.”132 Similarly, in GF, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated, “capacity
for considered evaluation of the collateral risks and consequences of
sexual activity sets the bar too high for capacity to consent to sexual
relations.”133 Like Justice Beveridge, Justice Pardu offered no reasons or
analysis to support this assertion (beyond reliance on the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal’s decision in Al-Rawi). Nor did her decision include any
explanation as to what constitutes collateral risks and consequences, as
opposed to primary or non-collateral risks and consequences.
Justice Beveridge’s rejection of a ‘capacity to appreciate risks and
consequences standard’ in favour of ‘the capacity to understand the
nature and quality of the sexual act standard’ is insufficiently protective of
women’s sexual integrity. Oddly, the conflation in Al-Rawi of two discrete
areas of sexual assault law (fraud and capacity to consent) inadvertently
raises an example that demonstrates this insufficiency.
Consider the following scenario. The accused and the complainant
engage in voluntary, unprotected, vaginal penetration to the point of
ejaculation. The accused is HIV positive and unmedicated, making his
viral load (his degree of infectiousness)134 higher than it would be if he was
properly medicated. Prior to the sexual activity, he told the complainant of
his HIV status. The complainant was severely intoxicated at the time of the
sexual activity but had the ‘minimal capacity’ necessary to understand that
she was being vaginally penetrated by the accused and that she could say
no. She was too drunk, however, to assess the risks and consequences of
engaging in unprotected, vaginal intercourse with someone who was HIV
positive and unmedicated. The level of minimal functioning needed to
comprehend that one is being vaginally penetrated and by whom, and that
one could say no, is clearly lower than the capacity needed to assess the
risks and consequences of having sex with someone who is HIV positive,
which turn on the presence or absence of a condom, whether ejaculation
occurs and if so whether it occurs inside or outside the vagina, whether the
individual is properly and consistently medicated and for how long, and
whether they have a high viral load.135
Based on the reasoning in Al-Rawi, the offence of sexual assault in
Canada offers no legal protection for this woman. In other words, based
on Justice Beveridge’s decision and provided he discloses his status, our
sexual assault law does not prohibit this accused from ejaculating inside of
severely intoxicated women he knows are too drunk to assess the risks of
132
133
134
135

Ibid.
GF, supra note 6 at para 36.
Mabior, supra note 108 at para 100.
Ibid at paras 93–103.
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permitting someone with his HIV status to do to them. Similarly, the law
of sexual assault would offer no protection to, nor prohibit him from doing
this to, a woman whose intellectual disability meant she could appreciate
the sexual nature of the act to which she was consenting, but lacked the
mental capacity to understand the risks and consequences of consenting
to this act with someone with his medical condition, without a condom.136
Now consider a slightly modified scenario in which the above facts
remain the same except that the accused does not disclose his HIV status
to the severely intoxicated (or intellectually disabled) complainant. The
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a two-part test to determine whether
consent to sexual activity was vitiated by deceptions with respect to
HIV status in Cuerrier: (1) there must be proof of dishonesty and either
deprivation or risk of deprivation. The deprivation may consist of actual
harm or a significant risk of harm; and (2) the trier of fact must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would not
have consented to the sexual activity had they known that the accused was
HIV positive.137 How could the Crown prove the latter in a case in which
the evidence suggests a severely intoxicated or intellectually disabled
complainant who knew she was having sex and could say ‘no’ but lacked
the capacity to understand the risks imposed upon her of doing so? In
that situation what difference would it make if the accused had told her of
his HIV status—she may well have engaged in the sexual activity anyway
because she lacked the capacity to understand the significance of that
status for her. Indeed, how could we not have a reasonable doubt as to
what she would have done if the accused had shared his HIV status with
her given that she lacked the capacity to assess this information? Based on
the reasoning in Al-Rawi it would certainly be open to defence counsel to
make this argument.

136 Conversely, a standard which focussed on a complainant’s ability to appreciate
the risks and consequences of the act would offer this protection to an intellectually
disabled woman. In R v Comeau, 2017 NSSC 62, a pre-Al-Rawi decision, Justice Duncan
found that a woman in her mid 70s with dementia and living in a residential care facility
did not have capacity to consent to the sexual contact which occurred with the facility’s
custodian. She could walk and talk with others and had the capacity to express voluntary
agreement. She initiated the sexual contact with the accused. Justice Duncan concluded
at para 49: “Ms. W. was unable to understand the risks and consequences associated with
the activity she engaged in with Mr. Comeau … Ms. W. lacked the necessary capacity to
consent to the sexual activity that she engaged in with Mr. Comeau”.
137 Cuerrier, supra note 108. See e.g. R v Pottelberg, 2010 ONSC 5756, in which the
Court acquitted on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant would
not have consented had he known the accused was HIV positive. The Cuerrier test was
affirmed in Mabior, supra note 108, at paras 104–05.
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There are problems with Canada’s sexual fraud laws.138 However,
given that the law of sexual assault criminalizes the non-disclosure of HIV
positive status in circumstances in which there is (what the Court has
deemed to be139) a sufficient risk of transmission, it is unjust to exclude
from its protection severely intoxicated women and some intellectually
disabled women. It makes little sense to establish a legal regime in which
women who are more vulnerable (whatever the cause of their incapacity)
receive less legal protection than those with greater capacity to protect
themselves. Yet in Nova Scotia (and Ontario as well, depending on what
the Court in GF meant by collateral risks and consequences) women who
lack the capacity to understand the risks and consequences of allowing
an unmedicated, HIV positive accused to ejaculate inside of them, do not
receive the same legal protection as women who are not incapacitated in this
manner. This is also true for severely intoxicated and some intellectually
disabled men who have sex with men. It was inappropriate to base his
rejection of the capacity to understand risks and consequences as part of
the necessary threshold for capacity to consent on the Supreme Court’s
deceptive sex jurisprudence. In addition, the standard Justice Beveridge
adopted in Al-Rawi in fact undermines the objectives underpinning the
sexual fraud jurisprudence in Canada.
Justice Beveridge appears to have based his rejection of a capacity
standard that requires the ability to assess risks and consequences on
a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court of Canada’s sexual fraud
jurisprudence. He asserts that:
[t]he proposed requirement that a complainant have the cognitive ability to
appreciate and assess the risks and consequences of the sexual act in question is
contrary to the Supreme Court’s rejection in R v Cuerrier, R v Mabior and R v
Hutchinson that knowledge of the risks and consequences of the act are necessary
components of a valid consent.140

He then notes that, “[d]eception about risks and consequences that expose
a complainant to serious risk of harm may vitiate consent, but it is not
part of the initial analysis.”141 What Justice Beveridge’s reasoning appears
to have overlooked is that capacity is also not a part of the initial analysis.
138

See Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization
of the Non-Disclosure of HIV” (2008) 31:1 Dal LJ 123; Isabel Grant, “The Prosecution
of Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to Rethink Cuerrier” (2011) 5:1 McGill JL &
Health 7; Isabel Grant, “Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in
HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions” (2009) 54:2 McGill LJ 389; Martha Shaffer, “Sex, Lies
and HIV: Mabior and the Concept of Sexual Fraud” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 466.
139 Mabior, supra note 108.
140 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 38.
141 Ibid at para 39.
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Recall that the legislative framework for determining consent involves
a two-stage process.142 The issue of capacity, like fraud, is considered at
the second stage of the analysis, under section 273.1(2) (or in the case
of fraud under section 265(3)(c)). While unconsciousness should be
considered at the first stage of the analysis, because an unconscious person
cannot voluntarily agree to have sex, whether a complainant’s voluntary
agreement was legally ineffective due to lack of capacity is to be assessed at
the second stage. It occurs after a trier of fact has determined that there was
apparent consent or voluntary agreement or a reasonable doubt regarding
lack of apparent consent.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson
did determine that knowledge of some risks and consequences is a
necessary component of a valid consent, such as the risk of pregnancy143
or the non-trivial risk of contracting HIV.144 In all three of these cases,
the Court found that the complainant’s lack of knowledge of the physical
risks and consequences caused by the accused’s deception rendered the
complainants’ apparent consent legally ineffective. Indeed, the majority in
Cuerrier, the first in this line of decisions, determined that the scope of the
duty to disclose turns on the degree of risk, “[t]o put it in the context of
fraud the greater the risk of deprivation the higher the duty of disclosure
… The nature and extent of the duty to disclose, if any, will always have
to be considered in the context of the particular facts presented.”145
Similarly, the majority in Hutchinson stated that, “[w]hat was critical to
[the complainant] was contraception and what she sought to mitigate
was the risk of pregnancy.”146 Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson did not
remove knowledge of risks and consequences as a necessary component
of valid consent. To the contrary, the concept of physical risks and
consequences is the operative part of the sexual fraud doctrine developed
in Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson. That the issue of fraud, like the issue
of capacity, is to be considered at the second stage of the analysis does
not change the fact that under Canadian law a valid consent does indeed
require knowledge of risks and consequences that pose a significant threat
of serious harm. But why require that this knowledge be given to severely
intoxicated and some intellectually disabled women if the law does not
require that they have the capacity to understand its significance for
them? Justice Beveridge’s reasons appear not to have accounted for this
implication of his decision.
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Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 57; GF, supra note 6 at para 41.
Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 70.
Cuerrier, supra note 108; Mabior, supra note 108.
Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 431.
Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 48.

2020]

Sexual Assault and Intoxication: Defining (In)Capacity to …

101

To be clear, the Court in each of Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson did
confirm that an accused is not required to disclose knowledge of all risks
and consequences, physical or social. For example, an individual does
not have to disclose risks to a sexual partner’s health that fall below the
threshold of serious bodily harm. Presumably this is because we assume,
as a policy matter, that people should be responsible for assessing these
types risks for themselves and that a failure to disclose them does not
warrant criminal sanction.147 After all, sex and risk are familiar bedmates.
Absent risks and consequences that pose a significant risk of serious bodily
harm148 or that could result in fundamental physical changes to a woman’s
body (such as pregnancy),149 Canadian sexual fraud jurisprudence places
responsibility on complainants to gather information for themselves or
to take necessary steps to protect themselves before voluntarily agreeing
to the sexual activity in question. The correlative implication of this legal
distribution of responsibility, one that arises directly from the sexual fraud
jurisprudence, is as follows: if there is no legal burden on an accused to
disclose a broader range of known risks and consequences, surely we
must require a threshold of capacity that includes a woman’s ability to
identify at least some of these risks and consequences for herself. That
is to say, since an individual is not legally obligated under the law of
sexual assault to, for example, disclose sexually transmitted infections like
chlamydia, shouldn’t the standard for capacity to consent require at least
the level of awareness and understanding necessary to observe and assess
the risks associated with agreeing to be vaginally penetrated by someone
whose penis is obviously oozing discharge or whose testicles are red and
inflamed? Similarly, since an individual is not legally obligated to disclose
that they have, for example, contracted chlamydia or gonorrhea and could
infect someone, it is only just that the standard for capacity to consent
not be less than that necessary to insist that a condom is used (whether
that be to avoid pregnancy or a sexually transmitted infection).150 Fairness
and even a modest commitment to protecting women’s sexual integrity
and physical autonomy demands that we have a standard of capacity that
corresponds to the legal approach to sexual fraud.
147

Gotell 2008, supra note 75. As Lise Gotell’s work has ably demonstrated, this
neo-liberal risk allocation approach to the issue of sexualized violence perpetuates victim
blaming and fails to account for the systemic inequalities that produce this gendered
violence. My argument is not intended to detract from this important critique or endorse
the neo-liberalism inherent in our current laws. My point is that this allocation of
responsibility to sexual actors in the sexual fraud jurisprudence should be recognized in
the incapacity to consent jurisprudence.
148 Cuerrier, supra note 108; Mabior, supra note 108.
149 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 70.
150 That any particular woman may not be inclined to insist on condom use or
watch for outward symptoms of sexually transmitted infections, sober or intoxicated, has
no bearing on what level of protection should be afforded under the criminal law.
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While it was problematic to establish a legal standard for capacity
based on the sexual fraud jurisprudence, Justice Beveridge’s reasoning
does encourage us to consider these discrete legal issues in relation to
one another. However, contrary to Justice Beveridge’s conclusions, the
Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the issue of sexual fraud very
much suggests that the ability to appreciate at least some risks and
consequences should be part of the legal standard for capacity to consent
to sexual touching.
B) The ‘nature and quality of the sexual activity’ standard is
inherently unclear and difficult to apply
The second problem with relying on ‘the ability to appreciate the nature
and quality of the sexual activity’ as the standard for capacity is that
there are inherent difficulties with attempting to make legal distinctions
based on this language. As the Court highlighted in Hutchinson, “courts
experienced great difficulty in formulating principled reasons for why a
certain deception did or did not relate to the nature and quality of the
act.”151 In Hutchinson the majority unequivocally rejected this approach,
stating, “[t]he problem was where and how to draw the line between
those aspects of the sexual activity that went to the ‘nature and quality
of the act’ and those that did not.”152 The Court went on to conclude
that, “[t]he lesson is clear. Broad adjectival approaches to ‘the sexual
activity in question’ … [are] too unclear, too easily manipulated, and too
unconnected with underlying policy rationales to provide a useful marker
of liability.”153 There is no reason to think a standard based on the nature
and quality of the sexual act will be clearer, less easy to manipulate, or
more connected to policy rationales in the capacity context than it was in
the sexual fraud context.
C) A standard which focuses on whether one understands
they can say yes or no rather than on whether one has
the capacity to give meaningful consent is insufficiently
protective of women’s sexual integrity
The third criterion included in the standard for capacity articulated in AlRawi focuses on whether the complainant had the capacity to understand
that she could agree or decline to participate in the sexual activity in
question. This criterion is also a problem. In some cases, if the complainant
provides any evidence of non-consent the court uses that as evidence that
151

Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 50.
Ibid at para 30.
153 Ibid at paras 52–53. The majority’s approach in Hutchinson requires further
consideration. The majority’s interpretation of section 273.1 is problematically narrow.
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she did not lack capacity.154 A standard of capacity that requires only the
ability to know that a sexual act is occurring and that one can say ‘yes or
no’ encourages this type of reasoning. A state of non-consent and lack of
capacity to consent should not be treated as necessarily incongruent.
That a woman has the minimal capacity necessary to mumble
an incoherent ‘no’ or manage an attempt at evasion in response to
unwanted sexual touching should not be equated with the capacity to
give “meaningful consent” to engage in the sexual activity at issue. 155 A
standard of capacity that turns on whether a complainant understood that
she could agree or decline to participate, rather than on her capacity to
make a meaningful choice, encourages judges to conclude that if she was
sober enough to say no at any point during the sexual contact, incapacity
cannot be established. The risk is that any evidence that the complainant
communicated non-consent may be deemed dispositive of the capacity
issue while insufficient to establish involuntariness beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In addition, as Grant and Benedet have argued, the capacity to say no
may be lower than that necessary to meaningfully consent.156 A legal test
that turns on a complainant’s capacity to understand that she can agree or
decline to participate risks obscuring this important distinction.
To summarize, the legal standard established in Al-Rawi does not
protect severely intoxicated women in some of the most vulnerable
sexual circumstances. It sets the legal standard too low and does not
provide courts with clear language upon which to make assessments of
capacity, which will undoubtedly encourage trial judges to continue to
rely on unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy for incapacity. It is not
consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation of consent in
JA and it risks encouraging courts to treat any evidence of non-consent as
dispositive of the issue of incapacity.
5. Capacity to Assess the Risks and Consequences of
the Sexual Activity at Issue Would Provide a Clearer,
More Just Standard
A standard that requires the ability to assess the risks and consequences
of engaging in the sexual activity in question is more consistent with
the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach in cases like JA and more
154

See e.g. R v Palmer-Coke, 2017 ONSC 4501 at paras 91–92; MRN, supra note 44;
R v Sawyer, 2014 ONCJ 186.
155 JA, supra note 18 at para 36.
156 See Benedet & Grant, supra note 101 at 3.
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appropriately protective of intoxicated women’s sexual integrity.
Professors Benedet and Grant argue that an assessment of capacity to
consent should be context-specific. A legal standard for capacity that is
based on the ability to appreciate risks and consequences must recognize
that the level of cognitive ability required to give meaningful consent will
vary depending on the context. It may, for example, require a higher level
of capacity to consent to sex with a stranger in a taxicab than to consent
to an intimate partner in a non-abusive relationship. It may also require
a higher level of capacity to consent to unprotected sexual intercourse
than to a kiss.157 Their suggestion is not intended to encourage judges
to inquire into the advisability of a woman’s particular sexual choices,
but rather to suggest that the level of capacity required turns on the
degree of risk and the nature of potential consequences: “the risks and
consequences of consenting are different in different situations and the
ability to understand more serious risks and consequences may in turn
require a higher level of capacity.”158 For instance, the level of capacity
needed to make a meaningful choice to have unprotected sex with
someone who is HIV positive will be higher than that required to consent
to have protected sex with an HIV positive individual. A higher level of
capacity may be necessary to make a meaningful choice to have sex with
multiple, unknown men at once than would be needed to consent to the
same sexual activities with one’s ongoing sexual partner.
This situational or contextual approach to assessing capacity to
understand the risks and consequences associated with the sexual activity
in question is compelling. It is important to emphasize that the threshold
legal question under this approach should be context-specific rather than
complainant-specific. In addition, the inquiry should not be whether
the complainant did assess the risks and consequences presented by a
particular context, but rather whether she had the capacity to make this
assessment. This is because a complainant-specific inquiry, as opposed
to a context-specific one, might encourage questions about, or reasoning
based on, the complainant’s individual tolerance for risk. This approach
would inevitably lead to consideration of her past sexual choices. A contextspecific inquiry should focus the analysis on factors such as the type of
sexual activity, the location, the relationship between the parties, and the
health status of the accused, not the complainant’s sexual propensities.
The same is true with respect to a focus on whether she assessed the
risks and consequences, rather than on whether she had the capacity to
make this assessment given her level of intoxication. A focus on whether
she assessed the risks and consequences might encourage questions such as
157
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the following: ‘well, is it not true that you have had consensual, unprotected
sex with strangers when you were not intoxicated?’ Conversely, a focus on
whether she had the capacity to assess the particular risks and consequences
should emphasize her level of intoxication and make her previous sexual
choices, drunk or sober, irrelevant.
In other words, a standard that is context (not complainant) specific
and that focusses on whether a complainant could (not did) assess the
risks and consequences associated with that context should not create a
basis for admitting (or relying upon) evidence of a complainant’s other
sexual activity that would otherwise be excluded under section 276 of the
Criminal Code.
In their recent work, Professors Benedet and Grant observe that even
judges who articulate a standard that includes the ability to understand
risks and consequences often do not then apply it when assessing the
evidence:
While judges often refer to the standard of being able to understand “the risks
and consequences associated with the activity to be engaged in,” when asked to
apply the standard to an individual complainant, the ability to assess potential
risks and consequences disappears from the analysis, even though it is at the heart
of consent standards outside of sexual assault.159

It is not clear why the risks and consequences element of the standard
seems to fall away at the application stage of the analysis in some cases.
One plausible explanation is that this tendency is rooted in stereotypical
assumptions about drunk women.160 Common stereotypes about women
who consume alcohol include the beliefs that they are: responsible for
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any consequences they suffer;161 sexually promiscuous or indiscriminate
in their sexual choices;162 and more likely to lie about rape.163 These
stereotypes have certainly informed the body of caselaw we are left with
today.164 It may be that even in cases in which a higher legal standard for
capacity is articulated—such as one that includes the ability to appreciate
risks and consequences—the application of this standard to the evidence
is distorted by stereotypical thinking about women, sex, and alcohol.
One further point regarding the legal standard in cases involving
intoxicated complainants should be flagged. Accused individuals should
not be permitted to avail themselves of the honest but mistaken belief in
communicated consent defence on the basis that they were unaware of a
complainant’s state of severe intoxication.165 Unless there is evidence that
the accused took reasonable steps (in the circumstances known to him) to
ascertain both her consent and the complainant’s capacity to consent the
defence should not be considered. Unfortunately, courts have not reliably
applied this doctrine.166
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6. Conclusion
The criminal law, as the Supreme Court noted in Hutchinson, draws a
line between conduct deserving of the harsh sanction of the criminal law,
and conduct that is undesirable or unethical but “lacks the reprehensible
character of criminal acts.”167 Is having sex with someone you know is
severely intoxicated—someone you know is, for example, too drunk to
insist on a condom, or notice the multiple sores on and around your penis,
or appreciate the social consequences of doing so in front of your whole
hockey team—sufficiently reprehensible such that it warrants the censure
of the criminal law? Or is this merely unethical or undesirable, but not
reprehensible, sexual conduct?
The trial judge in Al-Rawi suggested that the accused had a “moral”
or “ethical” (but not legal) obligation not to “tak[e] advantage” of the
severely intoxicated complainant by “going along” with any flirtation or
sexual invitation that the trial judge speculated might have occurred in that
case.168 Recall that the complainant in that case was so intoxicated she had
lost control of her bladder and was either unconscious, or within seconds
or minutes of becoming unconscious, when her clothing was removed.
Is ‘taking advantage’ of a woman in that condition merely undesirable or
unethical or is it the type of sexual conduct that the criminal law should
prohibit?
A trial judge’s task in a case involving an intoxicated complainant is
unenviable and made harder by the lack of guidance courts have received
from Parliament. Toxicology evidence is often unavailable or inconclusive.
The legal precedents by which they are bound articulate a legal standard
which encourages judges to rely on unconsciousness as the evidentiary
proxy. But the failure to find that severely intoxicated women—women
who cannot walk properly, who have vomited on themselves, or are
confused as to their whereabouts and what happened—lack capacity
may also stem in part from a refusal to recognize that engaging in sex
with someone in this condition is sufficiently reprehensible such that it
should be criminally prohibited. To return to the questions poised in the
opening paragraph: why can’t courts find that a woman who is “falling
down drunk,”169 or has vomited on herself and can’t remember anything
that happened,170 or is unable to dress herself properly and is “puking up
leaves”171 lacks the capacity to consent to sex? Why would incorporating
167
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into the legal standard the ability to appreciate the risks and consequences
(or some of them) of choosing to engage in the sexual activity in question
“go too far?”172 Unfortunately the answer to these questions may be
rooted in problematic social assumptions about women who get drunk:
that they are partly to blame for what occurred; that they are not to be
trusted; that, when drunk, women will consent to sex anywhere with
anyone even if they would not engage in this same behavior when sober.
Equally problematic is the attitude that the sexual predation of women in
this condition is caddish not criminal.
The legal standard applied in sexual assault cases involving severely
intoxicated women should require more than the rudimentary ability
or awareness necessary to know that sexual contact is occurring and
that one could say no. Providing trial judges with a more demanding
legal standard would encourage them to give more weight to evidence
of severe intoxication short of unconsciousness. However, raising this
threshold (through both the evidentiary proxies relied upon to establish
lack of capacity and the legal standard itself) will only be effective if we
can eliminate the influence of discriminatory social assumptions and
recognize that the sexual predation of drunk women warrants the criminal
law’s censure.
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